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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before this court on Austin O. 
Omoruyi's appeal from a final judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered on December 12, 2000, on a 14-count 
indictment charging him with mail fraud affecting a 
financial institution and money laundering. Omoruyi pled 
guilty to the mail fraud counts and does not challenge his 
conviction or sentence on those counts. Rather, he limits 
his challenge to his conviction and sentence for money 
laundering, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he had committed that crime or, 
alternatively, that the district court erred by applying the 
money laundering rather than the fraud sentencing 
guidelines in calculating his sentence. Because we find that 
neither of Omoruyi's contentions has merit, we will affirm 




In February 1999, a person not known to the authorities 
stole seven blank "convenience checks" attached to the 
bottom of First USA credit card statements from the mail in 
Texas. Later, in April 1999, a similarly unknown person 
stole three blank American Express convenience checks 
from the mail in New York. 
 
In approximately March and April 1999, Omoruyi opened 
three savings accounts at banks in the Middle District of 
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Pennsylvania in the names of "Charles Oloro" or "Robert 
Pierce." Thereafter, all ten of the stolen checks were made 
payable to Pierce or Oloro in amounts varying between 
$5,100 and $9,890, and deposited in the savings accounts, 
nine via the mail and the tenth at a teller's window.1 Later, 
on May 6, 1999, a counterfeit commercial check drawn 
against a law firm's account at a New York City bank was 
mailed to one of the banks for deposit, but the bank never 
credited the account for the proceeds of the check because 
it was suspicious of the transaction. 
 
After the banks credited the accounts with the deposits, 
Omoruyi began withdrawing funds from the accounts via 
automatic teller machine ("ATM") and teller window 
withdrawals.2 Most of the ATM withdrawals took place in 
New York and New Jersey, while most of the teller window 
withdrawals took place in Pennsylvania. 
 
Ultimately, postal inspectors determined that Omoruyi 
was "Robert Pierce" and "Charles Oloro." Accordingly, they 
established a surveillance on a Brooklyn mail drop Omoruyi 
had opened. When Omoruyi arrived at the mail drop on 
June 1, 1999, the inspectors arrested him. 
 
Following Omoruyi's arrest, the government first held him 
for prosecution in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York on the charge of making his 
third illegal entry into the United States. On February 2, 
2000, based on a conviction predicated on his plea of 
guilty, that court sentenced him to 51 months 
incarceration. Meanwhile, on July 21, 1999, postal 
inspectors filed a complaint in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania charging Omoruyi with mail fraud. On March 
29, 2000, a grand jury returned a 14-count indictment, 
charging Omoruyi with six counts of mail fraud affecting a 
financial institution and eight counts of money laundering. 
The six counts of mail fraud stemmed from the mailing of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Government states the deposits totaled $77,626, while Omoruyi 
states the total deposits were $80,424. The discrepancy is not material 
to our disposition of this case. 
 
2. Omoruyi admits he withdrew $33,900 from these accounts, while the 
Government contends he withdrew almost $70,000. The parties do not 
suggest that the discrepancy is material here. 
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the counterfeit check as well as five of the ten checks to 
banks in the Harrisburg area. The money laundering 
counts were based on eight teller window withdrawals by 
Omoruyi, utilizing false identification, at Harrisburg-area 
banks. 
 
On June 8, 2000, Omoruyi pled guilty to the mail fraud 
counts and submitted to a bench trial on the money 
laundering counts. The trial was premised almost entirely 
upon stipulated testimony and exhibits establishing that 
Omoruyi "opened [three] savings accounts and withdrew 
funds using the false names under which the savings 
accounts were established." Appellant's Br. at 6. After the 
court took the matter under advisement, on June 19, 2000, 
it found Omoruyi guilty on all eight money laundering 
counts. 
 
On December 11, 2000, the court sentenced Omoruyi to 
63 months incarceration on each mail fraud and money 
laundering count followed by three years of supervised 
release on each of these counts, and required him to pay 
$1,400 in special assessments and restitution in the 
amount of $31,209. The court ordered that the sentences 
run concurrently with each other as well as concurrently 
with Omoruyi's 51-month sentence imposed in the 
Southern District of New York. Thereafter, Omoruyi timely 




The district court had original jurisdiction over offenses 
against the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S 3231. We 
have jurisdiction over an appeal of a final decision by a 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and over an 
appeal of a final sentence in a criminal case pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 3742(a). 
 
A. Validity of the Money Laundering Conviction 
 
Omoruyi contends first that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish the elements of money laundering 
because he did not conduct a financial transaction with 
"proceeds" of the mail fraud. He argues that the mail fraud 
was not complete, and therefore did not yield "proceeds" 
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until he took possession of the cash credited to the 
accounts. Thus, in his view, the cash withdrawals could not 
serve as the basis for the money laundering counts. On this 
point, to the extent that the appeal involves legal 
determinations we exercise plenary review, but when the 
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we review the 
record to determine if there was substantial evidence to 
support the verdict. See United States v. Conley , 37 F.3d 
970, 975 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Pungitore, 910 
F.2d 1084, 1129 (3d Cir. 1990).3 
 
On this appeal, we are concerned with the construction 
of 18 U.S.C. S 1956(a)(1) which defines illegal money 
laundering as: 
 
       Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a 
       financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
       form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to 
       conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 
       involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-- 
 
       (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of 
       specified unlawful activity; or 
 
       . . . 
 
       (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole 
       or in part -- 
 
        (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the 
       source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of 
       specified unlawful activity . . . . 
 
Accordingly, section 1956(a)(1) sets forth the four elements 
of a money laundering offense: (1) an actual or attempted 
financial transaction; (2) involving the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity; (3) knowledge that the transaction 
involves the proceeds of some unlawful activity; and (4) 
either an intent to promote the carrying on of specified 
unlawful activity or knowledge that the transactions were 
designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, 
source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of specified 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In fact, the principles applicable to the validity of the conviction 
are 
essentially legal in character. 
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unlawful activity.4 See id. ; see also United States v. Morelli, 
169 F.3d 798, 803 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 820, 120 
S.Ct. 63 (1999). 
 
In Conley, 37 F.3d at 978, we considered whether the 
deposit of illegal gambling proceeds could support a 
conviction for the money laundering object of a conspiracy. 
There the defendant argued that the government failed to 
establish the essential elements of money laundering 
because the conduct upon which the government based the 
charge was essentially the same as that supporting the 
illegal gambling charges. See id. We explained the 
defendant's contention as follows: 
 
       McGrath contends before us that a wide variety of 
       transactions involving the money placed into the video 
       poker machines is necessarily part of the illegal 
       gambling business, including collecting and counting 
       money, dividing up money, transferring and 
       transporting money, depositing money into banks and 
       withdrawing money from banks. McGrath contends 
       that this same conduct cannot be properly alleged to 
       be money laundering. 
 
Id. We disagreed with the defendant's contentions. See id. 
at 978-79. In doing so, we acknowledged that "[o]bviously, 
whenever a defendant makes money from criminal activity 
he has something to do with it," and that "Congress did not 
enact money laundering statutes simply to add to the 
penalties for various crimes in which defendants make 
money." Id. at 979. But, we found that section 1956(a)(1) 
addressed this concern, and therefore delineated clearly 
between the underlying offense and the money laundering 
offense, by including an intent requirement. See id. We 
stated: 
 
       Section 1956(a)(1), quite clearly, does not prohibit all 
       financial transactions that are conducted with the 
       proceeds of specified unlawful activity. It only 
       proscribes those transactions that are conducted with 
       the intent to promote certain further illegal activity, 
       under subsection (A), or that are designed to conceal 
       under subsection (B). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Omoruyi does not appear to contest the first and third elements. 
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        These requirements would preclude the application of 
       section 1956 to non-money laundering acts such as a 
       defendant's depositing the proceeds of unlawful activity 
       in a bank account in his own name and using the 
       money for personal purposes. 
 
Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 
1991)). 
 
Furthermore, we indicated that for money to become 
"proceeds" it must be derived from a completed offense, or 
a completed phase of an ongoing offense. See id.  at 980. 
That being said, the conduct constituting the underlying 
offense conduct may overlap with the conduct constituting 
money laundering. See id. To that end, we found that the 
money, once collected from the various video poker 
machines, became " `proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity' " within the meaning of the money laundering 
statute, even though there may have been some overlap in 
the acts alleged to constitute the conduct of an illegal 
gambling business and money laundering. Id. (quoting 18 
U.S.C. S 1956(a)(1)). 
 
Applying Conley here, it is clear that there was 
substantial evidence supporting Omoruyi's money 
laundering conviction. Omoruyi contends, in an argument 
similar to that of the defendant in Conley, that the conduct 
charged as money laundering was the same conduct 
constituting mail fraud. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the 
money was deposited in bank accounts under false names, 
and Omoruyi used false identification to withdraw it, he 
clearly conducted the transactions charged with the intent 
to conceal or disguise the nature, source, ownership and 
control of the proceeds of the mail fraud. As we noted in 
Conley, section 1956 would not apply to a defendant's 
depositing the proceeds of unlawful activity in a bank 
account "in his own name" and using the money for 
personal purposes, as neither the "promote" or"conceal" 
aspects of the money laundering statute would be met. Id. 
at 979 (emphasis added). Here, however, there is sufficient 
evidence of concealment, and of Omoruyi's intent to 
conceal, to sustain his conviction. 
 
Moreover, Conley establishes that, at the very latest, the 
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money acquired through the mail fraud became "proceeds" 
at the time the checks were honored by the various banks. 
As we found in Conley, proceeds are derived from an 
already completed offense or a completed phase of an 
ongoing offense. See id. at 980. Here, the indictment 
charged six counts of mail fraud based on the mailing of 
fraudulently obtained checks to the various banks, while 
the money laundering counts were based upon eight 
subsequent teller window cash withdrawals. Therefore, the 
mail fraud offenses were complete as of the time the six 
checks were placed in the mail for delivery to the banks, 
and thus the money thereafter derived from the checks 
constituted the proceeds of the already completed offenses.5 
 
Notwithstanding Conley, Omoruyi also argues, citing 
United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 569-70 (10th Cir. 
1992), that money cannot be "proceeds" until the defendant 
has possession of it. Relying on the fact that the money was 
in bank accounts under false names, he contends that he 
was not in possession of it until he actually withdrew it and 
therefore the money could not be deemed proceeds until 
that time.6 He argues that "[t]he essential determination is 
when and how could possession of the funds be obtained," 
and because "the funds were never credited to an account 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The crime of mail fraud is defined as: 
 
       Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
       artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of 
       false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, . . . 
for 
       the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so 
to 
       do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail 
       matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the 
       Postal Service . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1341. In fact, even if the mail fraud was not completed until 
the banks collected the proceeds, our result would not be altered as the 
mail fraud would have been completed before the cash withdrawals. 
 
6. To this end, Omoruyi also relies on the court's statement in United 
States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1991), that "merely 
spending the proceeds of illegal activity does not violate the money 
laundering statute." As discussed previously, however, Omoruyi did not 
simply spend the proceeds of illegal activity. Rather, he engaged in a 
financial transaction designed to conceal the source, ownership and 
control of the proceeds. 
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under the name Austin Omoruyi," he could not be deemed 
to have possession over them until he had the cash. 
Appellant's Br. at 12. 
 
In Johnson, however, the court found the defendant had 
possession over the money so that it constituted"proceeds" 
once the wire transfers at issue were credited to his 
account. See Johnson, 971 F.2d at 569-70. We recognize 
that the account in Johnson was under the defendant's 
name, while the accounts here were under false names, but 
this factual distinction is not of legal consequence in the 
resolution of this case. Although deposited under false 
names, the money was credited to accounts over which 
Omoruyi had control, and therefore the money was in his 
possession. His utilization of fictitious names and 
identification to access the accounts enhances, rather than 
detracts from the money laundering aspect of Omoruyi's 
conduct as he used these names and identification to 
conceal the source, ownership and control of the money. 
Accordingly, we find that there was substantial evidence 
supporting Omoruyi's convictions for money laundering 
which we thus affirm.7 
 
B. Applicability of the Money Laundering Sentencing 
       Guideline 
 
Alternatively, Omoruyi contends that the district court 
erred in applying the money laundering sentencing 
guidelines, as opposed to the fraud guidelines, in 
calculating his sentence.8 This point is important because 
if everything else with respect to sentencing is equal, the 
money laundering guidelines will yield a higher sentencing 
range than the fraud guidelines. Resolution of this issue 
requires us to consider preliminarily whether we should 
apply amended money laundering guidelines, effective on 
November 1, 2000, to Omoruyi's sentence as the court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Moreover, Omoruyi contends that the government's action in 
prosecuting him for money laundering was "piling on" in violation of its 
own prosecution policies. We see no basis for this contention but in any 
event the policy, even if violated, does not create substantive rights 
entitling him to relief on this appeal. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1120. 
 
8. We review the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines 
de novo. See United States v. Bockius, 228 F.3d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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sentenced him on December 11, 2000, or whether we 
instead should apply the guidelines in effect at the time of 
his offense. In light of our recent decision in United States 
v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2001), we conclude that ex 
post facto principles preclude the application of the 
amended guidelines here. 
 
As a general rule, sentencing courts must apply the 
guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. See United 
States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 566 (3d Cir. 1994). However, 
where application of the guidelines in effect at sentencing 
would result in a more severe penalty than application of 
those in effect at the time of the offense, the court, to avoid 
an ex post facto violation, must apply the guidelines in 
effect at the time of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. 
Brannan, 74 F.3d 448, 450 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1014 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, 
the conduct forming the basis of Omoruyi's conviction 
occurred between March and June 1999, well prior to the 
effective date of the amended guidelines, while he was 
sentenced on December 11, 2000, approximately one and 
one-half months afterwards. While the district court did not 
discuss the effect of the amendments to the guidelines and 
thus did not note the ex post facto problem we have 
identified, in fact it sentenced Omoruyi without applying 
the November 1, 2000 amendments.9 Nevertheless, unless 
the November 1, 2000 amendments made the penalty more 
severe we should apply them on this appeal and should 
take them into account when considering Omoruyi's appeal 
of his sentence. Therefore, we must consider in our 
sentencing discussion whether Omoruyi would be subject 
to a more severe penalty under the amended guidelines 




9. The presentence report indicated that the"sentencing guidelines 
effective November 1, 1998, were used in [its] calculations." The court, 
in 
turn, indicated that it used the "factual findings and the guideline 
application in the presentence report" in imposing sentence with 
exceptions unrelated to the adoption of the November 1, 2000 
amendments. In fact, we are not even certain whether the court or the 
parties at the time of the sentencing were aware of the November 1, 2000 
amendments for, as Omoruyi points out, "[t]here was no discussion of 
the amendments at sentencing." Reply Br. at 7. 
 
                                10 
  
In Diaz, we considered whether the November 1, 2000 
amendments to the sentencing guidelines should apply 
retroactively to the defendant's sentence. See Diaz, 245 
F.3d at 296. Determination of this issue required us to 
consider whether the amended guidelines altered the law in 
effect at the time of the offense or merely clarified the law 
so that there was no substantive change between the dates 
of the offense and the sentencing. See id. at 301. After 
comparing the law prior to the amendments, namely our 
decision in United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 
1999), superseded by rule as stated in Diaz, 245 F.3d at 
294, and the amended guidelines, we concluded that Smith, 
and its approach to applying the guidelines, is no longer 
"good law." See Diaz, 245 F.3d at 303. 10 In cases such as 
that here, in which several counts, including mail fraud 
and money laundering, have been grouped pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(b), the amendments make it mandatory 
for the sentencing court to apply the guideline carrying the 
highest applicable offense level. See id. Under the 
guidelines prior to the amendments, however, the 
sentencing court was to conduct a heartland analysis of the 
guidelines, determine whether the defendant's conduct is 
atypical of cases usually sentenced under that guideline 
and, if so, determine what guideline would be more 
appropriate under the circumstances. See id. at 301 (citing 
Smith, 186 F.3d at 297-98). 
 
While it is true that the process that Smith required 
constituted a legal determination, see Smith, 186 F.3d at 
297-98, still it introduced a degree of uncertainty into the 
selection of the applicable guidelines that the November 1, 
2000 amendments eliminate. Thus, it is understandable 
that in Diaz we found that the amendments substantively 
changed the sentencing guidelines as interpreted by Smith 
and its progeny, and that application of the amended 
guidelines to a sentence issued prior to their effective date 
was precluded by ex post facto considerations. See Diaz, 
245 F.3d at 305. Diaz clearly is controlling here.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Of course, we did not mean that Smith was not "good law" with 
respect to cases involving offenses committed prior to November 1, 2000. 
11. In theory in Diaz we could have held that if under Smith the pre- 
November 1, 2000 money laundering guidelines were applicable then 
application of the amendments would be appropriate as there would not 
be an ex post facto problem. We did not, however, use this circular 
reasoning. 
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Accordingly, we will apply the pre-amendment guidelines, 
meaning the analysis established in Smith and its progeny, 
to this case and thus in this regard will use the same 
methodology in determining the applicable guidelines as the 
district court.12 
 
Pursuant to Smith, we conduct a heartland analysis of 
the money laundering guidelines to determine whether the 
conduct being punished is "atypical" of the conduct usually 
sentenced under the guidelines. See Smith, 186 F.3d at 
297. If so, then we are to determine what other guidelines 
would be more appropriate for sentencing. See id. 
 
In Smith, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to 
defraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, 
causing unlawful interstate transportation with intent to 
distribute stolen property, and money laundering. See id. at 
296-97. The money laundering count was based on checks 
written by another defendant on the proceeds of kickbacks 
where the defendant ordered that many of these checks be 
written to his creditors, as opposed to directly to him. See 
id. The district court grouped the four offenses and applied 
the money laundering guideline. See id. at 292. On appeal, 
we vacated the defendants' sentences and remanded the 
case for resentencing under the fraud guideline. See id. at 
300. 
 
Applying the analysis described above, we found that the 
use of the money laundering guidelines was inappropriate. 
See id. We concluded that the defendants engaged in 
conduct inconsistent with concealment, such as leaving a 
paper trail, that any efforts at concealment were 
disingenuous, and that when considered with the entire 
course of conduct, the money laundering was an incidental 
by-product of the fraud. See id. Inasmuch as we deemed 
this conduct to be outside of the heartland of conduct 
intended to be punished by the money laundering statute, 
the money laundering guidelines did not apply. See id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S.Ct. 1365 (2001), we recognized the principle that if a 
discretionary sentence becomes mandatory after the offense is committed 
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Since then, we have decided several cases applying the 
Smith analysis, the most relevant of which are United States 
v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 2001), and Diaz. In 
Mustafa we held that the district court did not commit 
plain error in sentencing the defendant under the money 
laundering guidelines. See id. at 496. There, the defendant, 
while operating a supermarket, deposited more than $1.5 
million worth of fraudulently obtained food stamps into his 
bank account. See id. at 487. In order for him to participate 
in the food stamp program, the government required the 
defendant to submit an application to the United States 
Department of Agriculture acknowledging that the bank 
account would be used to deposit food stamps obtained in 
accordance with governing law. See id. In addition, with 
each stamp deposit the defendant completed a required 
"redemption certificate" which purported to verify that the 
food stamps had been obtained legally. See id.  Following 
the defendant's guilty plea to, among other things, 40 
counts of money laundering, the district court utilized the 
money laundering guidelines and sentenced him to 135 
months imprisonment. See id. at 488-89. 
 
On appeal, we rejected the defendant's argument that the 
sentencing court improperly applied the money laundering 
guidelines because his conduct did not fall within the 
heartland of the money laundering statute, namely conduct 
involving the proceeds of large-scale drug trafficking and 
organized crime. See id. at 496. In doing so we found that 
the food stamp deposits were separate and distinct from the 
criminal activity from which they derived, namely the 
purchase of food stamps from persons involved in their 
illegal trafficking. See id. at 495. Further, with each 
deposit, the defendant represented that he had received the 
food stamps legitimately. See id. at 495-96. Therefore, his 
conduct was intended to create an appearance that the 
illegally obtained proceeds were themselves legitimate. See 
id. at 496. That the defendant had to deposit the food 
stamps for them to have any cash value was not 
determinative because he still intended to and was 
concealing the original source of the funds. See id. 
Accordingly, we affirmed the district court's application of 
the money laundering guidelines. See id. 
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We reached the opposite result, however, in Diaz . There, 
the defendant pled guilty to a four-count indictment 
charging her with, among other things, fraud and money 
laundering resulting from a scheme to obtain federal 
student financial assistance fraudulently on behalf of her 
cosmetology school. See Diaz, 245 F.3d at 296-98. The 
district court calculated her sentence based on the 
guidelines applicable to money laundering, and the 
defendant appealed. See id. at 296. 
 
On appeal, we examined Smith and the cases applying its 
methodology. See id. at 305-08 (citing and discussing 
Mustafa, 238 F.3d at 488-96; United States v. Bockius, 228 
F.3d 305, 309-13 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Cefaratti, 
221 F.3d 502 (3d Cir. 2000); Smith, 186 F.3d at 297-300). 
We found these cases rejected a reading of Smith  that 
would limit the use of the money laundering guidelines only 
to cases involving the proceeds of drug trafficking and 
organized crime. See id. at 309. Instead: 
 
       Mustafa, Bockius, Cefaratti, and Smith all are in accord 
       that the heartland of the money laundering guidelines 
       includes, in addition to drugs and organized crime, 
       cases involving typical money laundering, financial 
       transactions that are separate from the underlying 
       crime and that are designated either to make illegally 
       obtained funds appear legitimate, to conceal the source 
       of some funds, or to promote additional criminal 
       conduct by reinvesting the funds in additional criminal 
       conduct. 
 
Id. at 309-10. We distinguished these types of cases from 
"ordinary cases of routine fraud, . . . the simple receipt and 
deposit or use of illegally obtained funds, or . . . cases in 
which any money laundering is not separate from the 
underlying fraud, but merely an `incidental by product' of 
that underlying fraud." Id. at 310. Therefore, "where the 
defendant has not made a serious, concerted effort to 
conceal or to legitimize the funds or to reinvest them in 
additional criminal activity, it is not appropriate to sentence 
that defendant under the money laundering guideline." Id. 
 
Applying these principles, we found that the district court 
improperly sentenced the defendant under the money 
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laundering guidelines rather than the fraud guidelines. See 
id. at 311. The defendant, while having violated the money 
laundering statute by engaging in a monetary transaction 
in criminally derived property, neither used the proceeds of 
her fraudulent activities to promote additional criminal 
conduct, nor made any effort to disguise the source or 
nature of the funds.13 See id. We deemed the defendant's 
deposit of the student assistance funds to be inseparable 
from and an incidental by-product of the fraud and 
minimal in comparison to the totality of the unlawful 
conduct. See id. Therefore, we vacated the defendant's 
sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing under 
the fraud guidelines. See id. at 312. 
 
Omoruyi contends his sentence should have been 
calculated under the fraud guidelines because his money 
laundering conduct was minimal and incidental to the mail 
fraud. We reject that argument and hold that the court 
properly sentenced Omoruyi under the money laundering 
guidelines. First, the conduct charged in the indictment, 
eight teller window withdrawals, was separate from the 
underlying crime of obtaining fraudulently and mailing the 
convenience checks to the various banks. Further, this case 
is distinguishable from Diaz as there the money laundering 
count was predicated only on the defendant's deposit of the 
federal student assistance checks in the school's bank 
account. Arguably, had Omoruyi merely deposited the 
checks, his conduct would not be deemed separate from the 
underlying crime, and this case would be more akin to 
Diaz. However, Omoruyi took the additional step of 
withdrawing the proceeds of his criminal conduct, an 
activity clearly not part of the underlying mail fraud. 
 
Second, Omoruyi's conduct involved a concerted effort to 
conceal or to legitimize the funds obtained through the mail 
fraud. In that regard, this case is quite similar to Mustafa. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Diaz pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. S 1957(a) which makes it 
illegal 
to "knowingly engage[ ] . . . in a monetary transaction in criminally 
derived property . . . and is derived from specified unlawful activity. . 
. ." 
Therefore, unlike section 1956(a)(1), section 1957(a) contains neither a 
promote nor a conceal element. That Diaz was prosecuted under a 
different money laundering statute, however, does not affect our analysis 
under Smith. 
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In conduct similar to that of the defendant in Mustafa, 
though on a lesser scale, Omoruyi deposited approximately 
$75,000 worth of fraudulently obtained convenience checks 
in various bank accounts. Also, as in Mustafa , the deposits 
were intended to conceal the source and nature of the 
proceeds and create an appearance of their legitimacy. 
Moreover, Omoruyi laundered the proceeds through 
accounts he opened using two different aliases, further 
compounding his attempts to conceal the funds and his 
control over them. 
 
Finally, in Mustafa we found that the fact that the 
defendant had to deposit the food stamps for them to have 
value did not negate the fact that he engaged in money 
laundering. See Mustafa, 238 F.3d at 496. This conclusion 
renders unmeritorious Omoruyi's contention that the mail 
fraud was not complete until he received the funds from 
those offenses because before then the proceeds of the 
criminal conduct were of no use. Therefore, we find that 
under the version of the sentencing guidelines prior to their 
November 1, 2000 amendment, the district court 
appropriately sentenced Omoruyi under the guidelines 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
and sentence of the district court entered December 12, 
2000. 
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